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In contrast to the standard prediction of adverse selection in insurance markets, where high risk 
individuals purchase more insurance, numerous studies have found evidence of advantageous 
selection (Einav and Finkelstein, 2011). Recent studies include: Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) 
which provides evidence of advantageous selection in the market for long-term care insurance among 
elderly population in the US; Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) which provides evidence of 
advantageous selection in the US Medigap market for individuals aged 65 and over; Doiron et al. 
(2008) and Buchmueller et al. (2008) which find advantageous selection in the market for duplicate 
private health insurance in Australia; Bolhaar, Lindeboom and Klaauw (2012) which provide similar 
evidence for Ireland; and Lee (2012) which concludes that insurers in South Korea price discriminate 
to induce advantageous selection. As a measure of individual health expenditure risk, these studies 
rely on proxies of health status, such as a self-assessed health rating available in many surveys, 
predicted health expenditure from a secondary data source, or the unexplained variation in 
individual’s demand for health services. Rarely, is individual insurance information available together 
with the individual’s health expenditure, the most comprehensive measure health expenditure risk.     
Knowing the sources of advantageous selection is important for several reasons. First, it may increase 
the profitability of insurance firm by allowing them to design contracts, or to price discriminate, on 
the basis of the selection mechanism. Second, it may identify problems in the insurance market. For 
instance, Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) find that cognition is the primary source of advantageous 
selection in the US Medigap market, suggesting that the insurance purchase process in this market 
may be so complex that only those with good cognitive ability can enter the market. Third, it can 
characterise populations according to health risk which may in turn help in designing a targeted 
program for the sub-population with the highest health expenditure risk – to prevent future 
catastrophic health expenditures.  
In this paper we use a large Australian survey data set, linked to the administrative health records of 
respondents, to directly examine the relationship between health insurance demand and health 
expenditure. The survey data contains information about individual insurance status and socio-
economic characteristics, while the administrative health data contains expenditure on both in-hospital 
and out-of-hospital health services. The sum of these expenditures is the health expenditure risk score 
for each individual.  
The Australian health care system is ideal for examining advantageous selection: insurance firms are 
not allowed by law to refuse applicants and must use community rating when setting their premiums. 
This limits insurers’ ability to screen (‘cream-skim’) applicants. As in many European countries and 
Canada, Australian private health insurance cover is duplicate insurance. Private hospital cover is 
often bundled with supplementary coverage for ancillary services, such as dental and optical care. 
Australia’s universal health care system fully covers services in public hospitals and heavily 
subsidises out-of-hospital services and prescription drugs. The government also subsidises private 
treatment through a universal subsidy to private health insurance premiums, of 30% with a higher 
subsidy for those aged above 65. For the past decade, private health insurance coverage has been 
around 56-60%.  
Method and data  
To examine the nature of selection, the insurance demand model should include only the risk measure 
and those variables that insurers can use to set premiums. Under community rating system, insurers 
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cannot use individual characteristics such as age and chronic conditions to risk rate, so we estimate a 
binary choice model for insurance demand (probit) solely as a function of total health expenditure.  
Previous evidence leads us to expect a negative coefficient, indicating advantageous selection. We 
sequentially add observed individual characteristics to the model and observe changes to the 
coefficient on total health expenditure. The variable that switches the coefficient sign from negative to 
positive can be interpreted as the source of advantageous selection.  
The survey data comes from the 45 and Up Study which is a representative survey of non-
institutionalised older individuals aged 45 and over, fielded once in New South Wales (NSW) 
between 2006 and 2009. In 2010 NSW had a population of 7.23 million with 39% aged over 45. The 
sample consists of 263,737 respondents. Linked health expenditure data covers (i) private and public 
hospital admissions; (ii) emergency department (ED) presentations; (ii) medical services such as 
doctor consultations and diagnostic tests; and (iv) prescription pharmaceuticals.1 For each survey 
respondent, we calculate total expenditure in the survey year. Hospital expenditures are imputed using 
NSW Department of Health costing rules.2 For hospital admissions, expenditure varies by diagnosis, 
hospital type, type of care (overnight, same day, transfer, mental health unit, non-acute care units such 
as rehabilitation), length of stay, hours in the intensive care unit and use of ventilation machine. For 
ED presentations, expenditure varies by hospital type, urgency status and whether the patient is 
subsequently admitted. Annual hospital expenditures are combined with fees for medical services and 
prices for pharmaceuticals during the year which are directly observed in the data.  
As expected, we find those with high expenditure risk are less likely to buy insurance, implying 
advantageous selection. This is shown in Figure 1. However, there are a small number of individuals 
with very low risk who also have low demand for private health insurance. This suggests non-linearity 
in the insurance-risk relationship. We therefore consider more flexible specifications of expenditure 
based on percentile groups. We find that a flexible specification allowing 20 different slopes for the 
insurance-risk relationship provides a good fit. We use this model to investigate sources of 
advantageous selection.  
Table 1 summarises variables used to study the source of advantageous selection. The sample 
insurance rate is higher than the national average because our sample is an older cohort and has higher 
income than the national income for the 45+ population (27% of respondents have annual income 
greater than $70,000 compared to 15% nationally). Annual health expenditure is positively skewed 
with the average ($4,400) lying in the 16th of the 20 percentile groups.  
We test risk aversion, cognitive skill and expectation as potential sources of advantageous selection. 
Risk tolerance is often suggested as the primary source of advantageous selection in many economic 
studies of investment choice and risky behaviours. We have two potential measures of risk tolerance: 
whether the individual has ever smoked and whether the individual has undertaken health screening 
tests (prostate cancer screening (PSA test), bowel screening or mammogram). Both measures reduce 
the extent of advantageous selection although screening produces more dramatic change to the 
insurance-risk gradient. To test the impact of cognition, we use responses to the question on how an 
                                                          
1 The data linkage is performed by the Centre for Health Record Linkage (CHeReL) using a probabilistic 
matching on first name, surname, date of birth and address (see http://www.cherel.org.au/ for details). The 
linked, de-identified data is released under ethics approval. 
2 Source: Costs of Care Standards 2009/10. We validate these expenditures by comparison with publication by 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). A simple linear regression of the AIHW costs by diagnostic 
group on the imputed costs has an R-square of 0.966 with a slope coefficient of 0.940. We take this good fit and 
strong correlation as providing support for the validity of our imputed hospital cost estimates. 
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individual rates his/her memory. To test for the impact of the planning horizon, we use self-assessed 
quality of life which is likely to be positively related to longevity expectation and optimism, both of 
which affect health investment decision (e.g., Coelho and Mezza, 2012).  
Results 
Table 2 shows changes in the sign and significance (indicated with asterisk) of the insurance-risk 
relationship across the distribution of expenditure risk, as individual characteristics are added to the 
insurance model. We choose the 25th percentile group as the reference because, as shown in Figure 1, 
this approximates the location of the turning point in the insurance-risk relationship. The sign of the 
coefficients on other percentile groups indicates the impact relative to the reference group. In the base 
model which contains no individual characteristics, insurance is negatively related to risk, consistent 
with the prior expectation of advantageous selection. Controlling for risk tolerance does not change 
this relationship. Next, controlling for education flattens the insurance-risk relationship, except at the 
extremes. Adding income flips the insurance-risk signs to positive for higher risk groups, suggesting 
that income may be a source of advantageous selection. It also increases the fit of the model (pseudo 
R-squared). Adding cognitive ability does not change the sign or statistical significance for any group. 
Similarly, adding expectations and age does not change the sign and significance patterns.  
Corresponding to Table 2, Figure 2 Panel (A) illustrates the change in the insurance-risk gradient as 
individual characteristics are added to the base model. The base model represents the insurance risk 
gradient for the average person in the sample and it shows advantageous selection. We construct a 
‘representative’ individual guided by the median or the majority characteristic in Table 1: low risk 
tolerance as measured by never smoked, education set to trade/diploma, annual income between 
$40,000 and $50,000, good cognition is good and very good quality of life. First, we control for risk 
tolerance and illustrate the insurance-risk gradient when risk tolerance is low. Low risk tolerance 
shifts the base insurance rates upwards, but insurance-risk gradient is unchanged. Controlling for 
education, set at trade/diploma, the insurance-risk relationship becomes flatter but remains downward 
sloping. Income changes the insurance-risk gradient to positive. Good cognitive ability has very small 
impact. In contrast, very good expectations have a large impact on insurance demand, both as a 
demand shifter and as a variable that steepens the insurance-risk gradient in middle risk percentiles. 
Controlling for all individual characteristics, we find evidence for strong adverse selection. However 
we also find that expectation can switch advantageous to adverse selection without controlling for 
income and cognition. Figure 2 Panel (B) illustrates the risk-insurance gradient for different age 
bands. We find that age is largely a demand shifter but has little impact on the gradient.   
Concluding remark 
Income as the primary source of advantageous selection in Australia can be partly explained by 
financial incentives to hold private health insurance. A tax penalty of 1% of income applies if a high 
income individual or family does not have private health insurance, and this penalty can be more 
expensive than the insurance premium for standard cover. In addition, there is a 30% government 
subsidy to insurance premiums. As a result, government policies provide incentives for high income 
earners to enter the insurance pool. The effect of income may also reflect the well-known positive link 
between income and health. What is more interesting is the large impact of the quality of life variable 
which captures expectations about the future. This result supports previous evidence that those with 
better self-assessed health are more likely to buy insurance; indeed, using self-assessed health instead 
of quality of life produces a similar insurance-risk gradient. This suggests that insurance demand may 
be largely driven by individual heterogeneity in optimism about the future. As such, insurance holders 
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tend to be those who are less likely to make claims, which may explain the profitability of Australian 
private health insurers, despite the community rating system. 
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Figure 1: Insurance rate by percentile of expenditure risk  
  
Note: The x-axis is 100 groups of sample respondents, sorted by their total health expenditure. Each marker 
corresponds to each group, showing the sample insurance rate. Group 1 and 2 however are pooled together as all 





















Table 1: Sample mean and proportion 
Variable Level Mean (s.d)     Mean 
Insured 0.633    
Expenditure risk ($’000) 4.392 (9.219)        
Risk tolerance Screen 0.856 Cognition  Excellent 0.125 
 Ever-smoke 0.425 (Memory) Very good  0.303 
Education School 0.134  Good  0.369 
 Certificate 0.319  Fair  0.145 
 Trade/diploma 0.318  Poor  0.024 
 University 0.229  Missing 0.034 
Income <$5k 0.016 Expectation Excellent 0.224 
 $5k-<10k 0.040 (Quality of life) Very good  0.353 
 $10k-<20k 0.141  Good  0.269 
 $20k-<30k 0.096  Fair  0.085 
 $30k-<40k 0.079  Poor  0.016 
 $40k-<50k 0.072  Missing 0.053 
 $50k-<70k 0.104    
 >=$70k 0.234    
  Missing 0.217    
 
Table 2: Sign of insurance-risk relationship relative to the reference group  
Percentile Base Risk tolerance Education Income Cognition Expectation Age 
5 * * * * * * *
10 * * * * * * *
15 -  -  -  * * * *
20 +  +  +  -  -  -  -  
25                                      R e f e r e n c e    g r o u p 
30 -  -  +  +  +  +  +  
35 -  -  +  +  +  +  +  
40 * -  -  * * * +  
45 * * +  * * * *
50 * * -  * * * *
55 * * -  * * * *
60 * * -  * * * *
65 * * -  * * * *
70 * * * * * * *
75 * * -  * * * *
80 * * * * * * *
85 * * -  * * * *
90 * * * * * * *
95 * * * * * * *
100 * * * * * * *
Pseudo R-sq 0.004 0.0127 0.0682 0.1556 0.1591 0.1675 0.1728 
Note: The sample size is 263,737. Each column is derived from a probit model of insurance demand with the 
variable indicated by the column title added to the model from the previous column specification. The ‘Base’ 
model includes only expenditure risk and year dummy variables. Additional individual characteristics are added 
sequentially. The final column controls for risk tolerance (measured by ever-smoked), education, income, 
cognition, expectation and income. * indicates statistical significance at the 0.1% level. A high critical value is 




Figure 2: Insurance rate controlling for sources of advantageous selection 
   
Note: The x-axis is 100 groups of sample respondents, sorted by their total health expenditure. Each marker 
corresponds to a group, showing the mean predicted probability of having insurance from a probit model. Each 
series in Panel (A) is derived from a “cumulative” model in the sense that additional individual characteristics 
are added sequentially: ‘risk tol’ includes only risk tolerance and holds its effect constant at low risk tolerance; 
‘education’ includes risk tolerance and education with education level set to trade/diploma; ‘income’ includes 
risk tolerance, education and income with income set to $40k-50k; ‘cognition’ includes risk tolerance, 
education, income and cognition with cognition set to good memory; ‘expectation’ includes risk tolerance, 
education, income, cognition and quality of life with quality of life set to very good. Panel (B) shows the risk-
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